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Domination, Individuality, and 




ne of the most well known, but deeply debated, ideas presented by the 
philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, is the will to power. Scholars have 
provided a variety of interpretations for what Nietzsche means by 
this concept. In this paper, I argue that, under each interpretation, 
Nietzsche may still face what I call, the problem of moral chaos, or the problem of 
endorsing the claim that immoral acts, such as murder and torture, are justiﬁable 
as they exemplify the human will towards power over others. I ultimately argue 
that Nietzsche’s philosophy avoids this problem: though Nietzsche proposes it is 
possible to harm others as a way to power, we should not direct our will to power 
in this manner. To illustrate this point, I investigate common interpretations of the 
will to power, arguing that the psychological interpretation is the most compelling. 
From here, I demonstrate through Nietzsche’s passages that he clearly inspires 
humanity to direct the will to power towards individual inner growth, and not 
as a form of domination. Therefore, Nietzsche does not fall into the problem of 
moral chaos.  
Part I. The Will to Power: Metaphysical, Metaphorical or Psychological?
In order to understand the moral connotations of the will to power, we need 
to ﬁrst determine what Nietzsche really means by the will to power. There 
are generally three different interpretations: the metaphysical, metaphorical, 
and psychological interpretations.  In this part, I examine each of these 
interpretations, arguing that the psychological interpretation is the most 
compelling.
Those who explain the will to power as a metaphysical description of nature 
assert that Nietzsche expresses the will to power as being the nature of reality, 
and of all things inorganic or organic. There are two essential components 
to this metaphysical interpretation: human beings and the world. Regarding 
human beings, the will to power is emphasized as something real in human 
behavior. A being is presented as different forces of energy that are constantly 
ﬁghting for power (Danto 2005, 199-200).  In his posthumously published 
notes, Nietzsche presents the will to power as a system of “dynamic quanta” 
(WP:635), where such quanta are in a relationship of struggling to overpower 
one another. This power must be commanded or balanced to promote a 
healthy individual. If it is not, and one force has excess power in deﬁcient 
areas, then the individual is insufﬁcient, sick, or weak (Richardson 1996, 
39-43). 
Angel Cooper is 
a senior, majoring 
in Philosophy and 
English. This research 
began in the summer 
of 2009 as an Adrian Tinsley Program 
Summer Grant project under the 
mentorship of Dr. William J. Devlin. 
Angel has presented her research 
at the2009 Adrian Tinsley Summer 
Research Symposium and will be 
further presenting her research at the 
Undergraduate Mid-South Philosophy 
Conference. Angel plans to go to 
graduate school for Philosophy in the 
fall of 2010.
BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE 2010  •  THE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW  •  61
The world is also understood as will to power. John Richardson 
(2006) maintains that Nietzsche characterizes all of nature as 
the will to power. Nietzsche introduces this idea in Beyond 
Good and Evil, where he states:
Suppose, ﬁnally, we succeeded in explaining our entire 
instinctive life as the development and ramiﬁcation 
of one basic form of the will—namely, of the will to 
power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic 
functions could be traced back to this[,] […]then one 
would have gained the right to determine all efﬁcient 
force univocally as –will to power. (BGE:36)
This passage illustrates that Nietzsche was working with 
the theory that all things are reduced to the one underlying 
metaphysical substance that he calls the will to power. Nietzsche 
describes this substance as a “dynamic quanta” of energy and 
a “force” (WP:619) that is directed outward to overcome, 
master, or encapsulate other wills. According to Richardson, 
the will to power is an act of “taking power over something 
else, ‘incorporating’ it” (Richardson 1996, 22). All things in 
nature are consuming other things in an act for power and 
growth. As Nietzsche puts it, “This world is the will to power—
and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to 
power—and nothing besides!” (WP:1067). Thus, following 
this interpretation, we are a force of power. Whether power is 
described as an “effortful pursuit” (Richardson 1996, 22) or a 
drive to “overcome obstacles” (Danto 2005, 207), it is always 
what we are. Here, power is a drive in everything to move 
outward and consume space. 
Although the metaphysical interpretation can be supported 
in Nietzsche’s writings, I argue that there are several problems 
with this interpretation.  First, it is based primarily on 
Nietzsche’s notes and not his originally published works and it 
is inadequate to base an interpretation on information arrived 
at through Nietzsche’s notes, as it may be the case that these 
ideas weren’t fully developed yet. Second, this interpretation 
is inconsistent with Nietzsche’s ideas in his published works 
because it conﬂicts with his view of perspectivism, the epistemic 
claim that we only have knowledge and understanding 
through our human perspective, and know nothing beyond 
this. According to perspectivism, we cannot see the world-in-
itself, or the metaphysically real world, but only a world that 
is envisioned through our human perspective. Therefore, we 
can never truly know anything about nature. However, the 
metaphysical interpretation implies that we can know the truth 
about nature, since nature truly is the will to power. Thus, there 
is an inconsistency between this interpretation and Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism. Third, when we examine Nietzsche’s published 
accounts of the will to power, we ﬁnd he primarily presents the 
will to power only in humanity, and not in nature as a whole 
(see, for example, GM:II:12; GM:III:18; BGE: 19; BGE:259; 
Z:II:2). It is only obvious in his notes that he expands the notion 
to nature. So, though this interpretation may be grounded in 
Nietzsche’s notes, it is inconsistent with his published ideas on 
the will to power.
Finally, Nietzsche’s published passages of the will to power that 
seem to suggest a metaphysical interpretation can be explained 
in a non-metaphysical sense.  Take a famous passage, BGE:36, 
as an example. Aphorism 36 seems to be expressing that all of 
nature is will to power. However, Maudemarie Clark (1990) 
and Linda L. Williams (1996) each identify that this passage 
has a “hypothetical form” (Williams 1996, 454). Nietzsche 
begins with the statement, “Suppose all organic functions could 
be traced back to this will to power [.]” Thus, since it is a 
hypothetical statement, it is a mistake to say that Nietzsche here 
espouses the reality of the content made in the hypothetical 
statement; rather Nietzsche is only ‘speaking hypothetically,’ as 
it were. For these reasons, then, we can dismiss the metaphysical 
interpretation. 
The next view, the metaphorical interpretation, maintains that, 
since we cannot know anything about the world-in-itself, we 
must create a ﬁction for the human world, thereby creating 
meaning in our lives. Nietzsche does this by creating the will to 
power, a ﬁctional worldview. The will to power is thus not real 
in nature or humanity, but is, as Wayne Klein puts it, “one way 
among others of describing nature, a form of description that 
Nietzsche recognizes as explicitly metaphorical” (Klein 1997, 
156).  This metaphorical description is valuable for Nietzsche, 
as it is a creation that inspires humanity to say “yes” to life. 
Nietzsche proclaims, “For the game of creation, my brothers, 
a scared ‘yes’ is needed” (Z:I:1). Here, “The game of creation” 
is a ﬁction that establishes value in life, allowing us to embrace 
life and derive strength from it. 
According to this interpretation, Nietzsche created the ﬁction 
of the will to power because he values humanity’s strength in 
life. Instead of viewing the will to power as real in humanity, 
here it is understood as a perspective of Nietzsche’s that he 
places onto humanity. Following perspectivism, the will to 
power is one perspective Nietzsche offers as a means to envision 
the world. If we accept this image, we will constantly strive to 
overcome what we are and better ourselves or, in Nietzsche’s 
words, through the process of overcoming, “you shall become 
the person you are” (GS:III:270). 
I maintain that this interpretation falls short as well. First, there 
are passages from Nietzsche’s published works that describe the 
will to power as a psychological drive in all humanity, which 
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cannot be explained by the metaphorical interpretation. For 
example, in BGE:259 Nietzsche explains that each human being 
has a will to power and hence “belong[s] to the essence of what 
lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will 
to power, which is after all the will of life” (BGE:259). Since we 
have already determined that the metaphysical interpretation 
is incorrect, and because here Nietzsche describes the essence 
of human beings, we can clearly understand this passage as a 
psychological explanation of humanity. Nietzsche is proposing 
that the will to power is an observed psychological trait in 
humanity, and not just any trait, but the trait that motivates 
human beings to live. The metaphorical interpretation cannot 
explain this passage, as Nietzsche makes no indication here 
that he implies the will to power as a psychological metaphor. 
Instead, he expresses it as a literal psychological characteristic in 
human nature. Second, the metaphorical interpretation doesn’t 
provide criteria to determine which passages and ideas of 
Nietzsche’s are ﬁctional and which are not. Though Nietzsche 
endorses perspectivism, he allows for one to have knowledge 
about human truths. Since Nietzsche allows for human 
truths in his philosophy, this implies that some of the ideas 
or observations he describes about humanity are real. Now, 
given this point, although it is not inconsistent to determine 
that the will to power is a ﬁction for Nietzsche, following the 
metaphorical interpretation there is no deciding factor for why 
this is so. Here, the metaphorical interpretation faces a slippery 
slope. If the will to power is considered a ﬁction and there is 
no criterion to adjudicate ﬁctions from human truths, then 
all of Nietzsche’s explanations are ﬁctitious. But this entails 
an inconsistency with Nietzsche’s purported truths about 
humanity.  Thus, due to these reasons, I reject the metaphorical 
interpretation as an accurate account of the will to power.  
The ﬁnal interpretation of the will to power, the psychological 
interpretation, emphasizes the will to power as a secondary 
drive that inﬂuences ﬁrst order drives. In other words, it is 
a drive to overcome or improve our desires, activities, and 
passions. For instance, one may have a ﬁrst order drive, or 
desire, to be a writer, while the secondary drive – the will to 
power – underlies this desire and psychologically motivates one 
to overcome, or become better as a writer. The psychological 
interpretation proposes that Nietzsche conveys the will to 
power as only a drive in humanity. Rex Welshon explains that 
power for Nietzsche is striving to better one’s own activities 
and passions (Welshon 2004, 180-181). Nietzsche suggests 
this point in The Genealogy of Morals as he describes the will 
to power as “the strongest, most life-afﬁrming drive” and states 
that we are “obedient […] to the same basic instinct” (GM:
III:18). That is, the will to power is a drive in humanity and 
an instinct inherent in us. Furthermore, Welshon notes that 
the will to power (the secondary drive) shapes a speciﬁc desire 
(the primary drive) by constructing a new ability and changing 
not just a person’s ability, but his or her whole self (Welshon 
2004, 180-182). This is related to Nietzsche’s notion of self-
overcoming, as “realizing a drive or intention, the activity 
itself […] can result in our overcoming our goal in pursuing 
it” (181). Through shaping our activities, the will to power 
allows us to overcome ourselves by changing or growing, which 
reconstructs our whole being so that we have not just obtained 
a goal, but changed something fundamental in ourselves. 
I maintain that one can defend the psychological reading of 
the will to power from common objections presented against 
it.  The ﬁrst objection holds that this interpretation cannot 
account for Nietzsche’s obvious endorsement of humanity 
creating a ﬁctitious world, in passages like BGE:5, where 
Nietzsche speaks of philosophers creating “truths” and openly 
accepts that we create the world through images. To defend 
the psychological interpretation against this argument we must 
return to Nietzsche’s perspectivism and acceptance of human 
truths. If we consider the will to power a human truth about 
human psychology, then this interpretation is still consistent 
with BGE:5. In this case, the will to power as a psychological 
drive urges philosophers speciﬁcally to ﬁnd truths about the 
world-in-itself. Since they cannot ﬁnd such truths, philosophers 
create truths from their own values that they believe to be real 
truths about nature, so as to fulﬁll their need for understanding. 
These truths however, are not real about nature. Therefore, 
philosophers are only creating ﬁctions. Thus, following the 
psychological interpretation, the will to power is a human 
truth, meaning it is something we can observe in humanity 
through the human perspective. It is not something we have 
created, but something we recognize as a drive in humanity 
that motivates us to create an image of the world through our 
values.
A second objection holds that the will to power cannot be an 
underlying psychological drive for human beings because we 
ﬁrst need a primary desire, and then we feel the motivation for 
growth and overcoming in this desire (Clark 1990, 211). I argue 
that this objection fails because it is conceivable for the will to 
power to exist independent of any other drive. It is common to 
feel the need to struggle and better oneself without that need 
being initially inspired from a speciﬁc desire. It is plausible to 
have an underlying drive to struggle to overcome and then 
focus or direct that drive onto one’s passions and desires. For 
example, I may love to write, but my wanting to write better 
could come from the general motivation or desire to overcome 
all obstacles, and thus I would focus this drive towards writing 
because I enjoy doing it. Also, I may feel the desire to master 
any skill, so as to better myself or be the best at something, 
where the activity I am mastering is of less importance than the 
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feeling of mastering, itself. It is possible, then, for one to have 
a drive to struggle before having a desire. As Nietzsche puts it, 
“What does not kill me makes me stronger” (TI:Maxims:8), 
thereby suggesting the inherent value of struggling, itself.   
Thus, after examining all three interpretations of the will to 
power, I ﬁnd that the psychological interpretation is the most 
compelling. This interpretation can defend all the objections 
presented against it, which the metaphysical and metaphorical 
cannot do. It has no strong arguments to refute it. Having 
determined that the psychological interpretation is the correct 
account, we must now question if the will to power leads to the 
problem of moral chaos. 
Part II. The Will to Power: Strong Overmen  
or Brutal Tyrants?
In this part, I explore two questions: (1) Does Nietzsche 
maintain, descriptively, that violence can be a form of the will 
to power?, and (2) Does Nietzsche, normatively, maintain that 
one should perform violent acts to increase power? I argue that 
though the answer to the former is yes, the answer to the latter 
is no, thereby showing us why Nietzsche’s will to power does 
not lead to the problem of moral chaos. 
Through two speciﬁc passages from Nietzsche concerning the 
will to power, we can clearly observe that he does recognize 
these harmful acts towards others as an expression of the will 
to power.  The ﬁrst passage presents the will to power in those 
who are strong:  
Human beings whose nature was still natural, 
barbarians […] men of prey who were still in 
possession of unbroken strength of will and lust for 
power, hurled themselves upon weaker, more civilized, 
more peaceful races[.…] Their predominance did not 
lie mainly in physical strength but in strength of the 
soul[.](BGE:257)
Nietzsche describes the will to power in these “barbarians” 
through their attacking and dominating of weaker societies. 
We normally understand barbarians as those who have 
little sympathy, are uncaring, and are cruel. It is clear that 
Nietzsche traces these uncaring and unsympathetic acts of men 
dominating weaker men as an example of the will to power. 
Notice, however, that he describes these individuals as growing 
in their soul and not simply in physical strength. Although it 
can be directed in different ways, any overcoming is a form of 
the will to power, and Nietzsche illustrates here that these men 
are overcoming by dominating the weak. 
The second passage presents the will to power in the weak: 
“The will of the weak to represent some form of superiority, 
their instinct for devious paths to tyranny over the healthy—
where can it not be discovered, this will to power of the 
weakest!” (GM:III:14). Nietzsche explains that the will to 
power is even in the weakest of beings, but it is also expressed 
here as tyranny, domination, and oppression of others. As 
Kaufmann explains,  “[t]he assumption is that the powerful 
and the impotent are both imbued with the will to power, and 
that extreme or prolonged oppression and frustration may 
easily pervert this drive and make the oppressed look for petty 
occasions to assert their will to power by being cruel to others” 
(Kauffman 1974, 194). The act of hurting is not the expression 
of the will to power for the weak. It’s the superiority they feel 
in hurting others and a feeling of strength from this superiority 
is how they self-overcome (191). They become stronger and 
more assertive individuals by overpowering others. They grow 
inwardly by harming outwardly.
Thus, after examining these two passages, it follows that 
Nietzsche accepts domination and cruelty of others as a form 
of the will to power. Since the will to power is the drive for self-
overcoming, as long as individuals are growing and recreating 
themselves in some way, any act is a form of will to power 
whether it is harmful or generous. The answer then to the ﬁrst 
question is yes, harmful and violent acts towards others are a 
form of the will to power.  
We now need to determine if Nietzsche believes we should use 
violence as a way to gain power. If so, then the problem of 
moral chaos arises, because he would endorse a society whose 
members torture, murder, and manipulate others for their 
own gain. However, if not, then Nietzsche avoids the problem 
of moral chaos, because he will promote a society whose 
individuals focus on themselves in an effort to self-overcome 
and will not dominate and harm others as a means for strength. 
Richardson argues that Nietzsche expects humanity to use 
violence as a form of struggling to gain the greatest amount 
of strength that is possible for them (Richardson 1996, 
30). The argument here is that some of Nietzsche’s passages 
unmistakably praise injury, violence, and exploitation of other 
individuals as a way to gain power. Richardson explains that, 
for Nietzsche, “[a] drive’s strength level is measured by whether 
it is able to rule or master others in some way […] whereas 
growth or decline lies in ruling more or fewer […]” (30). He 
further holds that Nietzsche accepts violence and domination 
as one of the primary struggles for gaining the highest degree 
of power, claiming that “he most often and most emphatically 
identiﬁes growth as ‘increased’ mastery of others” (32). 
However, there is some bias in Richardson’s assessment that 
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Nietzsche accepts violence as a means to power. Richardson’s 
argument springs from the metaphysical interpretation and, 
therefore, is faulty. When arguing that Nietzsche endorses 
violence through the will to power, Richardson writes, “will 
to power aims at a real condition, speciﬁed independently 
of any perspectives about power” (Richardson 1996, 32). 
We have already determined though, that, for Nietzsche, we 
cannot disconnect ourselves from our perspectives, so the will 
to power cannot be explained as a phenomenon we understand 
contrary to a perspective. This is precisely what Richardson is 
claiming when he suggests that Nietzsche endorses mastery over 
others as a primary means towards power, because the drive for 
power is something fundamentally real in everything. Thus, 
Richardson’s argument fails because it is dependent upon the 
metaphysical interpretation of the will to power, and so carries 
with it, all of the problems attached to this interpretation.
Richardson also argues that there are passages from Nietzsche 
that suggest violent acts towards others should be a primary 
direction of the will to power. For instance, Nietzsche declares, 
“mankind in the mass sacriﬁced to the prosperity of a single 
stronger species of man—that would be an advance” (GM:
II:12). This statement appears to endorse harmful acts or 
manipulation of other beings for one’s own sake. However, 
neither here nor anywhere else in this passage does Nietzsche 
refer to a sacriﬁce as something violent or harmful for this mass 
of mankind. Nietzsche elsewhere explains the sacriﬁce of the 
weak as “serving a higher sovereign species that stands upon 
the former and can raise itself to its task only by doing this” 
(WP:898). Nietzsche here does not propose that the strongest 
men harm the weak, but that they must stand upon them. 
That is, the strong need the weak to achieve their strength. 
Furthermore, it is not evident that Nietzsche describes his ideal 
being, who he calls the overman (Z:P:3), as dominating or 
using weaker wills in a harmful or violent manner.2 He describes 
‘strong men’ or ‘barbarians’ as being harmful to others, but this 
is not the overman. He may respect the strength in these brutal 
types, but he aspires for us to become overmen, not barbarians. 
Nietzsche advocates a struggle to improve ourselves beyond 
what we have ever achieved.  He urges us to advance beyond 
this master morality (BGE:260) and become overmen, and he 
does not associate violence with these men.3 
Thus, although Nietzsche has a few passages that initially appear 
to endorse or lead to violent and harmful acts towards others, 
when examining these passages closely and relating them to the 
rest of his philosophy it is evident that they are not advocating 
violence and torture towards others. Nietzsche is presenting his 
description of human nature and his admiration of creation 
here. He illustrates, not that there are violent traits in humanity 
that must be intensiﬁed, but merely that humanity already has 
such traits, and we must accept this before we can further 
advance our species. 
Following Kaufmann, I maintain that while Nietzsche 
acknowledges harmful and violent acts towards others as a way 
to power, he does not encourage humanity to direct their will to 
power in this form. Kaufmann argues that “[w]hile Nietzsche, 
as a psychological observer, offers no evaluation, it is plain that 
he does not consider the neurotic’s will to power admirable. 
[…] [A] will to power is recognized of which Nietzsche, by 
all indications, does not approve” (Kaufmann 1974, 184). 
Nietzsche does not approve of weak individuals harming others 
as a direction of their will to power because “the will to power 
is a positive motive which would make us strive for something” 
(1974, 190).What is important for Nietzsche is that the will 
to power is a drive to overcome, not that one can be driven to 
violence. This drive towards self-overcoming inspires us to be 
beyond what we are today, what we are this very moment. And 
for Nietzsche this is life afﬁrming, which is one of his most 
esteemed aspirations. 
In Twilight of the Idols we may identify Nietzsche’s admiration 
of overcoming, as well as his disregard for either a domineering 
ruler or a weak slave for others to rule.  He writes, “How is 
freedom measured, in individuals[.…] One would have to seek 
the highest type of free man where the greatest resistance is 
constantly being overcome: ﬁve steps from tyranny, near the 
threshold of the danger of servitude” (TI:Untimely Man:38). 
Here, Nietzsche explains that the highest man is one who must 
always overcome. He is close to servitude, but not a servant, 
because if he was a servant he would not be able to struggle to 
overcome; he would be crushed instead. But this man is also 
not a tyrant, because if he were a tyrant he would care only for 
what he acquired and not for his inner growth and personal 
strength. Nietzsche makes it clear here that the highest man, 
the freest man, is the one who is neither a tyrant dominating 
weaker beings nor a servant who cannot rule himself. 
Not only does Nietzsche expect us to avoid becoming tyrants in 
the quest for power, but there comes a point where the strongest 
man can be more merciful and less harmful than we are today. 
In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche discusses a society that 
is so strong it has no use for such notions as exploitation to the 
individuals within it:
It is not unthinkable that a society might attain such 
a consciousness  of power that it could allow itself the 
noblest luxury possible to it—letting those who harm 
it go unpunished. […]This self-overcoming of justice: 
one knows the beautiful name it has given itself—
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mercy; it goes without saying that mercy remains the 
privilege of the most powerful man, of better, his—
beyond the law. (GM:II:10)
Nietzsche maintains here that the will to power may lead us 
to become so strong a society of individuals that we will not 
need to punish or harm others. He equates this act of “mercy” 
to “overcoming itself,” which is something he regards as 
beautiful.  Following Kaufmann, we can say that such acts are 
part of Nietzsche’s ideal direction of the will to power since 
although “the will to power may be ruthless and a source of evil 
doing [,] power itself does not corrupt but ennobles the mind” 
(Kaufmann 1974, 194). Mercy, then, is one form of nobility. 
Thus, Nietzsche ﬁnds this expression of the will to power 
superior to an expression of strength derived from violence. 
Although Nietzsche does acknowledge violence and domination 
as a form of the will to power, and even at times praises master 
morality as one of strength, I argue that this is only a descriptive 
tool for him. He uses this type of man to illustrate strength and 
counters it with those who embody weak wills. However, in the 
passages we have examined here, Nietzsche does not encourage 
us to be like these men, but like the overman. In such passages, 
he describes the overman as a stronger, more merciful, and 
braver being than the masters. Thus, I ﬁnd that Nietzsche does 
not espouse cruel and violent affects that we would normally 
think of as horrible. Rather, he encourages us to be stronger 
than this and to aspire to become overmen, those who have no 
need or desire to dominate weaker men. 
Conclusion: Overcoming Moral Chaos
Through the examination of Nietzsche’s works and scholars’ 
arguments on the subject, I ﬁnd that Nietzsche does not fall 
into the problem of moral chaos through his philosophy of 
the will to power. In other words, Nietzsche does not propose 
violence, murder, or torture of others as a viable or worthwhile 
form of the will to power, and thus is not led to a chaotic society, 
where all individuals struggle solely for their own personal 
advancement by any means necessary. Instead, he inspires us 
to become overmen, who are individuals which have such 
attributes as strength, bravery, and manners, and who aspire 
to live in a society in which there may be mercy for others, 
not domination of them. Nietzsche here is advocating a society 
that is not chaotic or psychotic, but instead strong, merciful 
and always overcoming itself so as to advance its laws and its 
people. Its members will reach beyond revenge and punishment, 
and be able to have healthy conﬂict with one another. This is 
Nietzsche’s ideal society. It is formed by overmen, and therefore 
does not fall into the problem of moral chaos.
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Endnotes
1  I will use the following abbreviations for Nietzsche’s works: BGE: Beyond 
Good and Evil; GM: On the Genealogy of Morals; GS: The Gay Science; TI: 
Twilight of the Idols; WP: The Will to Power; Z: Thus Spoke Zarathustra
2 The overman is the free spirit who actualizes the drive towards self-
overcoming, and lives his or her life authentically.
3 Nietzsche refers to master morality as the morality which endorses nobility, 
strength, and honor, and the domination of the weak.  He contrasts this 
kind of morality with slave morality, the morality that espouses weak virtues 
such as vengeance, pity, and the herd mentality.  See Essays 1 and 2 from the 
Genealogy of Morals and Chapter 9 from Beyond Good and Evil for Nietzsche’s 
assessment of these two moralities. 
